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CASENOTE
A World of Evergreen Fees? In re Pan
American Hospital and Evergreen Retainers
in Chapter 11 Reorganizations
Why, this bond is forfeit; And lawfully by this [Shylock] may claim
A pound of flesh, to be by him cut off. Nearest the merchant's heart.
-The Merchant of Venice'
I. INTRODUCTION
A common refrain among bankruptcy judges and practitioners is
this: it costs a lot of money to go bankrupt. While this statement on its
face appears counterintuitive, the tidal wave of large-scale corporate
reorganizations and liquidations has proved the truth of this proposi-
tion.2 Yet in the context of these legal fees is the simple fact that these
corporations that are reorganizing or liquidating are on highly tenuous
financial grounds, and the lawyer must secure his or her own financial
livelihood while simultaneously providing quality legal service.
This dilemma of the legal profession, that of providing legal ser-
vices to corporations whose future existence is questionable (and there-
fore whose future ability to pay is also questionable), is hardly new or
extraordinary, nor is it limited to bankruptcy.' A lawyer is in a very
different position from that of a third-party financier who provides post-
petition financing to a reorganizing corporation.4 However, the risk-
1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act IV, sc. 1.
2. See, e.g., Jeff St. Onge, Reorganization Billings Run Past $514 Million for Enron, CHI.
SuN-TLmEs, Nov. 17, 2003, at 56. As of May 2003, Enron's primary bankruptcy counsel had
billed over $87 million dollars worth of legal fees. Id. At that time, the total legal fees resulting
from Enron's collapse were predicted to be $880 million dollars by completion. Id.
3. Indeed, all lawyer compensation involves a conflict of interest. The client's preference
would always be to get top notch legal counseling for free (which only exists in the limited
context of pro bono work). These sorts of conflicts also exist in the structure of the representation
itself; how a law firm bills its time and what risks it takes are different than what the client would
prefer. Bankruptcy exacerbates these issues. Professor Westbrook notes that "in a circumstance
of financial crisis there is a profound conflict between the lawyer's interest in assurance of
payment and the client's interest in the application of scarce resources to other pressing needs."
See Jay Westbrook, Fees and Inherent Conflicts of Interests, 1 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 287,
297 (1993).
4. Post-petition financing is codified in bankruptcy law. See 11 U.S.C. § 364 (2000). A
debtor's current lenders often have the most at stake and typically provide the source of post-
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minimization of what would essentially be involuntary pro bono work is
constantly evolving through the efforts of clever lawyers. This Note is
devoted to a close examination of one such risk-minimization device, an
"evergreen retainer," as recently discussed in the opinion of Judge A.
Jay Cristol of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of Florida in In re Pan American Hospital Corp.5 In short, an ever-
green retainer is an agreement in which a law firm's retainer remains
intact until after confirmation of the bankruptcy plan is complete, and
the lawyer's compensation is paid from the debtor's operating capital.6
The problem derives from the fact that this agreement places burdens on
the corporation's operating capital while simultaneously withholding the
amount of the retainer until the reorganization is complete. All of this
occurs against a backdrop of the court's determination of what reasona-
ble compensation is under bankruptcy law, both in substance and form.7
In Part I, this Note will examine why this reasonableness compo-
nent exists in the context of compensation for bankruptcy attorneys, and
briefly introduces two seminal cases on evergreen retainers prior to Pan
American Hospital. With the stage set, Part II will then carefully
examine the facts and procedure behind Pan American Hospital and the
bankruptcy judge's opinion itself. The Note will then scrutinize the
validity of evergreen retainers as an appropriate tool to hedge risks, from
both the perspective of a law firm and from that of the corporate debtor,
in Part III. This section will also briefly look at a possible justification
for using evergreen retainers in bankruptcy after the United States
Supreme Court's recent decision in Lamie v. U.S. Trustee.'
This Note concludes that an evergreen retainer is an important risk-
minimization device and should not be invalid per se, but that the terms
of the evergreen retainer should be scrutinized at the outset to ensure
that it provides fiscal security to the lawyers while simultaneously pro-
viding the liquidity of funds needed by the debtor corporation. Because
an evergreen retainer is distinct from a traditional retainer in that it holds
a sum of cash outstanding until the confirmation of the bankruptcy plan,
and because correcting an unreasonable term in a compensation agree-
ment with an attorney is difficult, this scrutiny is important at the outset
petition financing. The Code provides that post-petition financing will be allowable as an
"administrative expense." Id. Administrative expenses have first priority among unsecured
creditors. See id. § 503.
5. 312 B.R. 706 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2004).
6. However, outside of the bankruptcy context, evergreen retainers have been defined as
"[requiring] clients to replenish the retainer fee as the money is drawn down by the law finn."
Sandra Torry, Recession Forces More Firms to Make Bottom Line a Top Priority, WASH. POST,
Feb. 18, 1991, at F5.
7. 11 U.S.C. § 329(b).
8. 540 U.S. 526 (2004).
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of a bankruptcy case. While every Chapter 11 case is different, and
courts can only rely upon general factors to provide guidance (necessa-
rily precluding a bright-line approach), this scrutiny allows for risk-min-
imization superior to a typical retainer, while simultaneously ensuring
that the evergreen retainer is a rational expense on the part of the
corporation.
II. EVERGREEN RETAINERS: A PRIMER
A corporation's choices on who to retain as counsel, and upon what
terms the retention is made, are generally within the "business judg-
ment" of the firm, and are entitled to the wide judicial deference com-
monly associated with the business judgment rule.9 The business
judgment rule is characterized as a doctrine of abstention,10 a sharp bar-
rier preventing courts from inquiring into the wisdom of a board's deci-
sion making, provided the board complies with basic procedural
requirements. 1 Thus, a challenge to the retention of counsel because
the corporation violated its duty of care to shareholders is likely doomed
to failure (even if the retention is made under outrageous and egregious
terms),' 2 unless the shareholder can prove procedural defects,13 or that
the transaction violated a duty of loyalty.' 4
But when a corporation approaches insolvency, the scope of these
"fiduciary duties" is altered. When a corporation becomes insolvent, or
when insolvency is near, the fiduciary duties of the officers and directors
9. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811-12 (Del. 1984).
10. See Stephen Bainbridge, Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L.
REv. 83 (2004). Professor Bainbridge cogently argues that the abstention view of the business
judgment rule is the only view that provides proper deference to decisions made by the board of
directors. Id. at 87-88. Because a court cannot increase accountability of a board of directors
without a commensurate interference and derogation of the board's ability to exercise authority,
courts must be reluctant to review such decisions absent evidence of self-dealing. Id. at 128-30.
11. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 811-12.
12. See, e.g., Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). This case is perhaps the most
extreme example of the application of the business judgment rule. Here, the Disney board was
accused of breaching its fiduciary duty in approving an extravagant and wasteful employment
agreement with former CEO Michael Ovitz, which ultimately resulted in Ovitz earning $140
million dollars for approximately 14 months of work. Id. at 249-52. On August 9, 2005, the
Delaware Court of Chancery reaffirmed the application of the business judgment rule to the
Disney case, finding that although the board fell short of the best practices of business governance,
the business judgment rule protected the board from monetary liability. In re Walt Disney Deriv.
Litig., 2005 WL 2056651, at *41, 51 (Del. Ch. 2005).
13. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
14. The duty of loyalty is distinct from the duty of care, and triggers a different standard of
review. The standard of review for a duty of loyalty claim is designed to avoid the possibility of
fraud and the temptation of self-dealing. If a plaintiff invokes a duty of loyalty claim, the
defendant has the burden to prove the intrinsic fairness of the transaction. See, e.g., Lewis v. S.L.
& E., Inc., 629 F.2d 764, 769 (2d Cir. 1980).
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expand to include a duty to creditors (in addition to shareholders). 5 A
fundamental question is raised by these additional fiduciary obligations:
when a debtor-in-possession retains a lawyer, who is the client of the
lawyer? Some courts have stated that management and its counsel owe
fiduciary duties to an estate in bankruptcy. In In re Blue Top Family
Restaurant, Inc., 6 Judge Bentz of the Bankruptcy Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania found that the actual client of an attorney hired
by the debtor-in-possession is the estate with its creditors. 17 However,
some courts have held that because of the conflicting interests that an
estate is created to serve, it is impossible for debtor's counsel to attempt
to serve the estate, and it is the debtor itself that counsel must serve. In
Jones & Leta P.C. v. Segal,I" Judge Brett of the United States District
Court in Utah agreed with this view. Judge Brett found that the estate of
a Chapter 11 debtor is merely a collection of proprietary interests that is
not in itself a legal entity and therefore cannot exist as a client.' 9 Judge
Brett also argued that safeguards exist that require counsel to help the
debtor carry out its responsibility to act in the best interest of the
estate.2 ° These safeguards are of statutory origin: a disinterestedness
requirement, 1 a disclosure requirement,22 and a reasonableness of com-
pensation requirement.2 3
Chapter 11 is a rehabilitative process to reorganize an insolvent
individual or corporation and put the party on a path to financial viabil-
ity.24 Either a voluntary petition by the debtor or an involuntary petition
initiates the Chapter 11 process.2 5 In Chapter 11, a debtor is normally
allowed to remain in possession of its assets and to continue to operate
the business, with oversight from the bankruptcy court and a committee
of creditors. 26 The goal of the Chapter 11 debtor is to formulate a plan
of reorganization, accepted by a majority of creditors and confirmed by
the court, that binds all parties to the reorganization.
27
15. Geyer v. Ingersoll Publ'n Co., 621 A.2d 784, 786 (Del. Ch. 1992). Marcia Goldstein and
John Rapisardi have conducted a thorough analysis of the fiduciary duties an attorney owes to an
insolvent corporation. See Marcia Goldstein and John Rapisardi, Fiduciary Duties for Distressed
Companies Murky, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 14, 1998, at 11.
16. 110 B.R. 777 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990).
17. Id. at 777.
18. 220 B.R. 434 (D. Utah 1998).
19. See id. at 450-51.
20. See id. at 465.
21. See FED. R. BANRI. P. 2014.
22. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 2016.
23. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 330 (2005).
24. WILLIAM WARREN & DANIEL BRUSSELL, BANKRuprcY 585 (6th ed. 2002).
25. Id. at 22-23.
26. Id. at 594.
27. Id. at 760.
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At the outset of the bankruptcy process, a bankruptcy "estate" is
created out of all legal and equitable interests that the debtor possesses,
subject to certain exemptions as provided by state or federal law. 28  Two
fundamental issues are involved in Chapter 11 proceedings: 1) the size
of the estate (and how to maximize it); and 2) the division of the estate.29
Professional services are designed to help maximize the estate.3"
Because the debtor is insolvent, its creditors have an interest in minimiz-
ing the costs of these services, as excessive expenditures on attorneys
translate into a smaller estate.
Several statutory sections of the Bankruptcy Code address retention
of an attorney; the sections share a commonality in that they all require
that the attorney's compensation be reasonable. 3  Reasonableness is a
classic amorphous standard that is preclusive of bright-line rules. By its
28. Id. at 28.
29. Cynthia A. Baker, Other People's Money: The Problem of Professional Fees in
Bankruptcy, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 35, 42 (1996).
30. Attorneys for debtor corporations can help maximize the estate through several devices.
For instance, the Bankruptcy Code permits a debtor-in-possession to recover from creditors
payments made shortly before the bankruptcy filing where the payment gave the creditor more
than other similarly situated creditors would obtain through the bankruptcy process (subject to
several possible defenses). See 11 U.S.C. § 547 (2000).
31. The relevant sections of the Bankruptcy Code are listed below in pertinent part:
a) The trustee, or a committee appointed under section 1102 of this title, with the
court's approval, may employ or authorize the employment of a professional person
under section 327 or 1103 of this title, as the case may be, on any reasonable terms
and conditions of employment, including on a retainer, on an hourly basis, or on a
contingent fee basis. Notwithstanding such terms and conditions, the court may
allow compensation different from the compensation provided under such terms and
conditions after the conclusion of such employment, if such terms and conditions
prove to have been improvident in light of developments not capable of being
anticipated at the time of the fixing of such terms and conditions.
11 U.S.C.A. § 328 (2005).
(a) Any attorney representing a debtor in a case under this title, or in connection
with such a case, whether or not such attorney applies for compensation under this
title, shall file with the court a statement of the compensation paid or agreed to be
paid, if such payment or agreement was made after one year before the date of the
filing of the petition, for services rendered ...
(b) If such compensation exceeds the reasonable value of any such services, the
court may cancel any such agreement, or order the return of any such payment, to
the extent excessive, to-
(1) the estate, if the property transferred-
(A) would have been property of the estate; or
(B) was to be paid by or on behalf of the debtor under a plan under
chapter 11, 12, or 13 of this title; or
(2) the entity that made such payment.
Id. § 329 (2005).
(a) (1) . . . the court may award to a trustee, a consumer privacy ombudsman
appointed under section 332, an examiner, an ombudsman appointed under section
333, or a professional person employed under section 327 or 1103-
(A) reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services rendered by
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very nature the standard invites resolution on a case-by-case basis.3 2
The courts, in their limited appraisals of the validity of an ever-
green retainer, use two different approaches when evaluating their rea-
sonableness. One approach is premised on the belief that these retainers
are reasonable only in very limited circumstances. Provided these cir-
cumstances exist, the fee is justified by public policy that necessitates
risk-minimization to avoid injuring the debtor's ability to secure high-
quality representation.
The second approach is a "market-driven" analysis of reasonable-
ness. Because evergreen retainers are acceptable tools outside of the
the trustee, examiner, ombudsman, professional person, or attorney and
by any paraprofessional person employed by any such person; and
(B) reimbursement for actual, necessary expenses.
(3) In determining the amount of reasonable compensation to be awarded...
the court shall consider the nature, the extent, and the value of such services,
taking into account all relevant factors, including-
(A) the time spent on such services;
(B) the rates charged for such services;
(C) whether the services were necessary to the administration of, or
beneficial at the time at which the service was rendered toward the
completion of, a case under this title;
(D) whether the services were performed within a reasonable amount of
time commensurate with the complexity, importance, and nature of the
problem, issue, or task addressed;
(E) with respect to a professional person, whether the person is board
certified or otherwise has demonstrated skill and experience in the
bankruptcy field; and
(F) whether the compensation is reasonable based on the customary
compensation charged by comparably skilled practitioners in cases other
than cases under this title.
(4) (A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the court shall not allow
compensation for-
(i) unnecessary duplication of services; or
(ii) services that were not-
(I) reasonably likely to benefit the debtor's estate; or
(I) necessary to the administration of the case.
(5) The court shall reduce the amount of compensation awarded under this
section by the amount of any interim compensation awarded under section
331, and, if the amount of such interim compensation exceeds the amount of
compensation awarded under this section, may order the return of the excess to
the estate.
(6) Any compensation awarded for the preparation of a fee application shall be
based on the level and skill reasonably required to prepare the application.
(7) In determining the amount of reasonable compensation to be awarded to a
trustee, the court shall treat such compensation as a commission, based on
section 326.
Id. § 330 (2005).
32. Black's Law Dictionary defines "reasonable" as "fair, proper, or, moderate under the
circumstances." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1293 (8th ed. 2004).
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bankruptcy world, they are presumptively reasonable. The inquiry then
moves on to particular terms that may require alteration to better con-
form to the court's vision of what the case requires and how to best
balance the needs of all the players in the Chapter 11 reorganization.
The seminal case on risk-minimization is U.S. Trustee v. Knudsen
Corp. (In re Knudsen),33 a decision rendered by the Bankruptcy Appel-
late Panel for the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Knudsen, a dairy
corporation, sought approval for a fee payment and application proce-
dure that would permit periodic post-petition payments to their lawyers
without prior court approval of the payments.34 The structure of the fee
itself was quite similar to the evolved evergreen retainer that courts are
now grappling with." The monthly fee application operated in similar
fashion to an evergreen retainer in that it permitted periodic replenish-
ment of the attorney's retainer.36 The Knudsen court recognized the
problem implicit in absolutely rejecting these risk-minimizing steps:
"[W]hen counsel must wait an extended period for payment, counsel is
essentially compelled to finance the reorganization. This result is
improper and may discourage qualified practitioners from participating
in bankruptcy cases; a result that is clearly contrary to Congressional
intent. ' 37 Knudsen, however, must be read in a restrictive light, because
it requires four findings to authorize this type of retainer:
1) [t]he case is an unusually large one in which an exceptionally large
amount of fees accrue each month; 2) [t]he court is convinced that
waiting an extended period for payment would place an undue hard-
ship on counsel; 3) [t]he court is satisfied that counsel can respond to
any reassessment; and 4) [t]he fee retainer procedure is, itself, the
subject of a noticed hearing prior to any payment thereunder.38
In Knudsen, the court was likely also influenced by the fact that the
reorganization was a controlled liquidation for the principal secured
creditor, who approved the procedure and was advancing the fees.3 9
Indeed, an important factor that runs throughout cases considering the
validity of evergreen retainers is whether the creditors have approved the
procedure.4' No objection is favorable to the validity of the evergreen
fee: the "no harm, no foul" maxim.
Recent developments in how "reasonableness" is defined, coupled
33. 84 B.R. 668 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1988).
34. See id. at 669-70.
35. See In re Pan Am. Hosp. Corp., 312 B.R. 706, 711 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2004).
36. See Knudsen, 84 B.R. at 669-70.
37. Id. at 672 (footnote omitted).
38. Id. at 672-73.
39. See id. at 673.
40. See In re Benjamin's-Arnolds, Inc., 123 B.R. 839, 841 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1990); In re
Insilco Techs., Inc., 291 B.R. 628, 635 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003).
2006]
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with a persistent concern for ensuring high-quality representation, have
sparked a retreat from the restrictive analysis set forth in Knudsen. In re
Insilco Technologies, Inc.,4  a decision by the United States Bankruptcy
Court in Delaware, is representative of this retreat. Insilco Technologies
entered into bankruptcy after a significant and continuous downturn in
the telecommunications industry.42 Insilco was a very large bankruptcy
case, with assets of over $345 million and liabilities in excess of $4
billion.43 The size of the bankruptcy compelled Insilco to seek retention
of several large law firms to assist in the bankruptcy proceedings. 44 As
part of the terms of the proposed retention, the law firms sought ever-
green retainers.45
Judge Carey upheld the use of evergreen retainers in Insilco's
Chapter 11 proceedings. Judge Carey noted that the framework under
the Bankruptcy Code first requires determining what is reasonable.46
While evergreen fees are not valid simply because of their use in the
marketplace, Judge Carey observed, the prevalence of evergreen retain-
ers in practice is noteworthy.47  Judge Carey rejected a bright-line
approach to evergreen retainers, noting that they must be tailored to the
particular circumstances of the case.48  Five factors to be considered
include:
1) whether the terms of an engagement agreement reflect normal bus-
iness terms in the marketplace; 2) the relationship between the Debtor
and the professionals, i.e., whether the parties involved are sophisti-
cated business entities with equal bargaining power who engaged in
an arms-length negotiation; 3) whether the retention, as proposed, is
41. 291 B.R. 628.
42. Id. at 631.
43. Id. at 631 n.5.
44. Id. at 631.
45. Id. at 632.
46. Id. at 633.
47. Id. at 634. Judge Carey relied on United Artists Theatre Co. v. Walton, 315 F.3d 217 (3d
Cir. 2003), for this proposition. Id. Walton involved a retention agreement made between
bankrupt United Artists and financial advisors Houlihan Lokey that exempted Houlihan Lokey
from their own negligence. 315 F.3d at 223. To examine whether this provision was reasonable,
Judge Ambro placed the fee under the sophisticated (yet deferential) glare of a corporate law
framework. Id. at 229-33. This approach created three opinions, despite the fact that the three-
judge panel came to the same conclusion. Judge Ambro's opinion is sharply refuted by Judge
Rendell. Id. at 235 (Rendell, J., concurring). Judge Alito's middle ground appears to present the
case in a light most agreeable to this panel. Judge Alito reads the majority opinion as stating that
while such indemnification agreements entered into by bankrupt companies are not interpreted in
accordance with corporate law, corporate law provides a sophisticated framework for evaluating
circumstances in which indemnification agreements are not categorically unreasonable under the
Bankruptcy Code. Id. at 235 (Alito, J., concurring). Thus, corporate law principles are useful in
shedding light upon market circumstances and understanding particularized conduct by parties,
but should not determine reasonableness in and of itself.
48. In re Insilico, 291 B.R. at 634.
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in the best interests of the estate; 4) whether there is creditor opposi-
tion to the retention and retainer provisions; and 5) whether, given the
size, circumstances and posture of the case, the amount of the retainer
is itself reasonable, including whether the retainer provides the appro-
priate level of "risk minimization" especially in light of the existence
of any other "risk-minimizing" devices, such as an administrative
order and/or a carve-out.
4 9
Under this approach to evergreen retainers, Judge Carey found that each
prong of the enunciated test was met.5" However, the court called for
any application of employment to highlight the evergreen retainer provi-
sion and attach an exhibit that makes clear the intent to hold an ever-
green retainer.51
III. IN RE PAN AMERICAN HOSPITAL
A. The Factual and Procedural Background of
In re Pan American Hospital
Pan American Hospital's tale is a unique one. The non-profit hos-
pital was founded in western Miami-Dade County by Cuban exiles in
1963, in response to the influx of Cuban immigrants in the wake of the
turbulent social and political events in Cuba.52 Pan American was ini-
tially a modest hospital with approximately 75 beds; by 1997 the hospi-
tal had grown to 146 beds.53
Notably, throughout its history Pan American maintained a signifi-
cant and close connection to the Cuban community. For example, the
hospital served patients black beans and rice (traditional Cuban cui-
sine). 5' This cultural focus in turn inspired loyalty from the Cuban pop-
ulation-even as the company filed for bankruptcy, its occupancy rates
hovered near 90 percent, far exceeding that of many area hospitals.55
This historically strong foundation, along with its unique benefits to the
principally Cuban clientele, helped the hospital maintain financial
49. Id.
50. Id. at 634-35.
51. Id. at 636.
52. Pan American Hospital, http://www.pahnet.org/history.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2005).
53. Id.
54. John Dorschner, West Dade Hospital Files for Bankruptcy Protection, MIAMI HERALD,
Mar. 12, 2004, at IC.
55. This fact is particularly relevant in understanding why Pan American Hospital is a
corporate reorganization (Chapter 1I) as opposed to liquidation (Chapter 7). Bankruptcy
proceedings normally impose adverse effects on the reputation of a business-a taint that further
burdens a company in the midst of bankruptcy. High occupancy rates during bankruptcy are
encouraging signs of the viability of Pan American Hospital and its potential to successfully
complete the reorganization process (known in bankruptcy parlance as the "confirmation plan").
2006]
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viability.56
Like many corporations, Pan American's fall was brought about by
a mixture of bad luck and bad business decisions. The hospital's
problems can be attributed primarily to two sources: labor unrest and
onerous debt from the purchase of several clinics .5  The former problem
arose after Pan American hired a new Chief Executive Officer who sub-
sequently reduced employee benefits, including vacation time for first-
year nurses and the available number of sick days.58 In response to
these actions, the unhappy employees of Pan American voted to
unionize.59
The more significant impetus to bankruptcy, however, was a 1999
purchase of 17 clinics from United Healthcare for $65 million and a
percentage of proceeds to the health insurer.6° While the purchase was
initially a move to expand the hospital's services (and likely to capitalize
on the Cuban-oriented service the hospital was renowned for), it quickly
revealed itself to be a disastrous transaction for Pan American Hospi-
tal.6 ' United Healthcare took the patients of the clinics with them and
the clinics hemorrhaged money. 62 Pan American Hospital sought to
negotiate with United Healthcare, but these efforts proved fruitless and
the hospital closed the clinics and fired the employees. 63 United Health-
care then exercised a contractual provision providing for binding arbitra-
tion. 6 The arbitrator rejected most of the hospital's defenses, creating a
claim by United Healthcare for $60 to $70 million.65
Additionally, the hospital fired the executive who made the deal,
who in turn sued Pan American Hospital, claiming that the firing was in
retaliation for her discovery of financial irregularities.66 These labor and
contractual burdens were also accompanied by rising malpractice insur-
ance costs, and ever-present costs associated with accepting underin-
sured and uninsured patients for emergency medical treatment.6"
On March 5, 2004, Pan American Hospital filed a voluntary peti-
56. Soma Biswas, Pan American Hospital Goes Under, DAILY DEAL, Mar. 15, 2004,
available at 2004 WLNR 17772013. Prior to an acquisition of the clinics, the hospital had $30
million dollars in cash. Id.
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tion for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida.68 Three
days later, the hospital made its first-day motions; among these was an
application for the employment of Kluger, Peretz, Kaplan & Berlin
("Kluger Peretz"), pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 327.69 As part of the
employment agreement, the hospital requested authority to give Kluger
Peretz a general retainer with compensation fixed by the court. 70 The
hospital also requested a risk-minimization device for Kluger Peretz,
known as a "shortened fee application," that would allow them to be
compensated and reimbursed for expenses every sixty days.7 ' The court
approved both the employment application and the shortened fee
application.72
Two months later, Kluger Peretz filed its first interim fee applica-
tion, which divulged its intention to hold a pre-petition retainer of
$79,557.00.7 3 This retainer, Kluger Peretz explained, would be treated
as an evergreen retainer.74 The U.S. Trustee objected to the evergreen
retainer, and argument was heard before Judge A. Jay Cristol on June 1,
2004.75
B. The Court's Opinion in In re Pan American Hospital
The court's opinion started by noting that there are two types of
retainers: classic retainers (a payment to a lawyer made irrespective of
any service, merely to secure the lawyer's availability for a given period
of time), and special retainers, which take one of three different forms:
(a) a security retainer, which the attorney periodically deducts from for
actual services rendered; (b) an advance fee retainer, by which the
debtor pays in advance for the services expected to be performed on
behalf of the debtor, or; (c) an evergreen retainer, in which the retainer
remains intact and the interim compensation is paid from the debtor's
operating capital, while the professionals holding the retainer "do not
look to this sum until such time as a final fee application is presented
and approved by the court."76
The court noted the relevant statutory provisions regarding profes-
sional retention and compensation, excerpting 11 U.S.C. § 328 and 11








76. Id. at 709.
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U.S.C. § 329. 77 These provisions, the court found, compel the bank-
ruptcy court to scrutinize the terms of a debtor's professional engage-
ment by the aforementioned reasonableness standard, with discretion
given to the court to determine which services and charges are
reasonable.78
Judge Cristol incorporated the "market-driven" approach of Insilco
while addressing the issue of reasonableness.7 9 However, the Delaware
analysis was not accepted as wholly dispositive.80 In addition to review-
ing the evergreen retainer under the permissive Insilco analysis, the
court subjected the retainer to the Knudsen test.81
There are two possible explanations for this bifurcated analysis.
First, because a risk-minimization device already existed, perhaps the
court worried that additional protection would be unreasonable and
superfluous for Kluger Peretz, and potentially hazardous to other players
in the Chapter 11 process. This naturally invites the question of whether
the existence of multiple risk-minimization devices trigger a Knudsen
analysis. However, the bifurcated analysis is better clarified by an alter-
native explanation: perhaps Pan American Hospital stands for the pro-
position that evergreen retainers should be filtered through both forms of
analysis, thus producing a more comprehensive assessment of the costs
and benefits of permitting the retainer.
Yet the court in Pan American Hospital watered down the Knudsen
analysis. Knudsen envisioned the application of these risk-minimization
devices in rare cases that satisfy four conditions: a) an unusually large
case featuring exceptional amounts of monthly fee accrual; b) in which
waiting an extended period of time for payment would place an undue
hardship on counsel; c) where the professional is capable of disgorging
fees if necessary; and d) where the fee retainer procedure itself is subject
to prior notice and hearing.82
First, the court dismissed the U.S. Trustee's objection that while
Pan American Hospital may be an important case to local citizens, it is
not "unusually large" under Knudsen, as Knudsen's fees dwarfed those
of Pan American Hospital (from the court's figures, Knudsen cost
around $3,000,000 per year, while Pan American Hospital cost around
$878,000 per year).83 Pan American Hospital thus offers an alternative
77. Id. at 710.
78. Id.
79. See id. at 710-11.
80. Id. at 711.
81. Id.
82. U.S. Trustee v. Knudsen Corp. (In re Knudsen), 84 B.R. 668, 672-73 (9th Cir. B.A.P.
1988).
83. In re Pan Am. Hosp., 312 B.R. at 711.
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to the stringent limitations imposed by Knudsen: as long as the fees
incurred meet a substantiality requirement-thereby justifying the need
for risk-minimization-the "unusually large" prong of the Knudsen test
is satisfied.84
The second prong of Knudsen received similar scrutiny from the
court. At the outset, the court noted that it originally approved the short-
ened fee application process to prevent any undue hardship to Kluger
Peretz.85 The court reasoned that, by requesting greater protection,
Kluger Peretz implicitly alleged that a shortened fee application was
insufficient to hedge the risks involved in the case.86 Thus, the court
held that Kluger Peretz failed to meet their burden regarding the neces-
sity of implementing multiple risk-minimization devices.8 7 This repre-
sents Pan American Hospital's second lesson: to obtain the benefit of
multiple risk-hedging devices, lawyers must demonstrate that multiple
devices are necessary to prevent undue hardship. This requirement
diverges from Insilco. Insilco asked whether, at the beginning of the
case, plan confirmation was a probable outcome.88 If it is uncertain
whether the case will reach the plan stage of the reorganization, the exis-
tence of other risk-minimizing devices should not preclude an otherwise
appropriate evergreen retainer.89 Pan American Hospital, on the other
hand, placed the burden of persuasion regarding the necessity of multi-
ple risk-minimization devices on the party seeking to obtain the ever-
green retainer. 90 That party must prove that the needs of the case justify
placing additional constraints on the debtor's capital.91 While the uncer-
tainty of success remains a factor under Pan American Hospital, it is
less determinative than in Insilco.92
Finally, the court in Pan American Hospital did not address the
disgorgement prong of the Knudsen test, and only mentioned the notice
requirement in a footnote, in determining the reasonableness of the ever-
green retainer.93
84. See id. at 711-12.
85. Id. at 712.
86. Id.
87. Id. ("By requesting an additional risk-minimizing device, KPKB is essentially asserting
the 60-day period for interim fee applications is not sufficient to protect against the risk of non-
payment. The Court disagrees; the shortening of time for the filing of fee applications is sufficient
to adequately minimize KPKB's risk of non-payment in this case. The Court is not persuaded that
KPKB has proven it is necessary to implement multiple procedures to protect it from the risk of
non-payment of its fees.")
88. In re Insilco Techs., Inc., 291 B.R. 628, 635 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003).
89. See id.
90. See In re Pan Am. Hosp., 312 B.R. at 712.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See id. at 712-13, 713 n.1.
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Ultimately, Pan American Hospital represented a judicial attempt
to allocate risks through a pragmatic, fact-intensive balancing of each
party's interests, with a view toward the consequences imposed by an
evergreen retainer. The court sought a middle ground between two
undesirable outcomes. On the one hand, making counsel's risk-minimi-
zation efforts presumptively unreasonable dissuades top lawyers from
taking Chapter 11 cases, where risk of nonpayment is possible.9 4 On the
other hand, providing lawyers too much protection gives credence to the
public perception that Chapter 11 is merely a "cash cow" for lawyers.95
Hence, the Pan American Hospital court offered the debtor the ability to
attract the best counsel, provided the individual terms would not render
the retainer improvident. The court also intimated that in extraordinary
cases, lawyers may utilize multiple risk minimization devices.96
C. What In re Pan American Hospital Means
In re Pan American Hospital is a curious addition to the current
evergreen retainer doctrine. The court appears to have avoided both the
market-driven approach of Insilco, and the heavily-regimented approach
of Knudsen and its progeny. Alternatively, the court adopted reasoning
from both lines of cases, while offering its own unique protection for
creditors-evergreen retainers will frequently exclude other risk-mini-
mization devices. 97 '
The emerging middle ground, however, yields numerous uncertain-
ties. Satisfaction of the market-driven reasonableness test espoused by
Insilco appears to be insufficient under a Pan American Hospital analy-
sis. Arguably, Pan American Hospital employed the Knudsen test in
lieu of the fifth Insilco element.98 Under this approach, the retainer
terms have to meet some level of fee substantiality, which leads the
court to believe there are appropriate conditions for risk-minimization. 99
But, Pan American Hospital significantly derogates from Knudsen.
One uncertainty under the Pan American Hospital approach is
whether the length of time of reorganization is a critical factor. For
instance, in In re Benjamin's-Arnolds, Inc.,"° an important factor
94. See id. at 711.
95. See In re ACT Mfg., Inc., 281 B.R. 468, 473 n.2 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2002); see generally
SOL STEiN, A FEAST FOR LAWYERS (1989).
96. In re Pan Am. Hosp., 312 B.R. at 712.
97. See id.
98. In re Insilco Techs., Inc., 291 B.R. 628, 634 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003) (stating the fifth
element as "whether, given the size, circumstances and posture of the case, the amount of the
retainer is itself reasonable, including whether the retainer provides the appropriate level of 'risk
minimization,' . . .").
99. In re Pan Am. Hosp., 312 B.R. at 711-12.
100. 123 B.R. 839 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1990).
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announced by the bankruptcy judge was that the reorganization was to
be a swift one."°1 An evergreen retainer is designed to help secure a
lawyer from risk of nonpayment. The policy goal ultimately to be
achieved is to ensure that qualified lawyers will take on Chapter 11
cases that could be filled with uncertainty and risk. Yet swift reorgani-
zations are often the antithesis of uncertainty and risk. Many swift reor-
ganizations are in fact "pre-negotiated bankruptcies" or "prepackaged
bankruptcies."' 02 A lawyer that involves himself in this kind of bank-
ruptcy knows the risks going into the case and much of the necessary
planning is completed either before or shortly after the case begins.
Essentially, the structure of the case already acts to minimize risk, and it
should be questioned whether an additional risk-minimization device is
necessary. It is also contrary to Knudsen, in that in a swift reorganiza-
tion no real undue hardship would exist, because there is no extensive
wait. 10 3 There may be a wait, to be sure, but in a swift reorganization
that connotes a high degree of organization and planning, negotiation
itself should provide an adequate means of risk-minimization for
lawyers.
However, targeting the protection of risk-minimization devices
toward a more typical Chapter 11 case, where a plan and disclosure
statement is filed many months (and sometimes years) after the case is
filed, is also problematic. If a case is drawn out with a small chance of
success, serious inquiry must be made as to whether an evergreen
retainer is a provident restriction of operating expenses. When framed
in terms of the best interest of the estate, evergreen retainers become
questionable because they impose doubly on the debtor's operating capi-
tal (through both the retainer and the drain on operating capital).
Some legal commentators suggest that Pan American Hospital
requires one risk-minimization device only. 1°4 Nonetheless, it is clear
that evergreen retainers are valid in Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganiza-
tions in Florida in at least some cases. The more difficult step is to parse
how such a retainer is analyzed. Pan American Hospital runs evergreen
retainers through both a market-driven test to establish reasonableness
under the Code, and a watered down Knudsen analysis that seeks to
101. Id. at 841.
102. United Artists Theatre Co. v. Walton, 315 F.3d 217, 224 n.5 (3d Cir. 2003)
("'Prenegotiated' bankruptcies have plans of reorganization and disclosure statements filed
shortly after the cases themselves file, usually before the committee of unsecured creditors is
formed .. .[whereas in a prepackaged bankruptcy,] the plan and disclosure statement are filed,
and sufficient favorable votes on the plan are solicited and obtained, before the Chapter 11 case
begins, leading to a prompt plan confirmation.").
103. See In re Knudsen, 84 B.R. 668, 672-73 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1988).
104. Only 1 Risk-Minimizing Device Per Customer, 43 No. 10 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (LRP) 1, Aug.
24, 2004.
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establish a substantiality of need."°5 Pan American Hospital places a
high evidentiary burden on lawyers seeking multiple risk-minimizing
devices to establish the existence of an undue hardship. 10 6 Continued
reasonableness was also important to the court, and it was explicitly
noted that at the time a hearing is held on a law firm's fee application for
interim compensation, any party in interest can object that the terms
have become unreasonable over time.
10 7
D. Aftermath
The restructuring of Pan American Hospital has not gone smoothly.
Notably, the court appointed an examiner to act as an independent inves-
tigator into the corporation's problems.10 8 The examiner's report was
highly critical of the hospital's management, accounting practices, and
purchasing habits.'0 9 In the wake of this report, the court replaced the
board of directors with a new slate approved by the company's credi-
tors.' t0 The bankruptcy currently stands at a fork in the road. While
there is some optimism that the hospital can eventually become profita-
ble again, it is becoming increasingly more likely that the hospital will
be purchased by another hospital group."t'
Nor has the restructuring gone smoothly for Kluger Peretz, the
counsel for Pan American Hospital. In addition to the problems that
Pan American Hospital has presented, the firm's evergreen retainer has
backfired. After approval of the evergreen retainer, the court eventually
approved a shortened fee application for everyone except Kluger Peretz,
because Kluger Peretz already had the protection of its evergreen
retainer. 12 While every other party in the litigation was paid every 60
days, Kluger Peretz was paid every 120 days.1 13 Kluger Peretz then
drew down on the evergreen retainer, per the debtors' instructions. 114 In
an order denying Kluger Peretz's shortened fee application, the court
105. See In re Pan Am. Hosp. Corp., 312 B.R. 706, 710-12 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2004).
106. See id. at 711.
107. See id. at 713.
108. The appointment of an examiner is an alternative to the appointment of a Chapter 11
trustee. See DAVID G. EPsTEIN, ET AL., BANKRUPTCY § 10-10 (1992). The Code sets out the
scope of an examiner's role and the method by which they are appointed. See 11 U.S.C.A
§ 1104(b) (2005).
109. See Brian Bandell, Pan American Hospital Criticized, S. FLA. Bus. J., Apr. 18, 2005,
available at http://www.bizjournals.com/industries/economicviewbankruptcies/2005/04/18/
southflorida story 1 .html.
110. See Brian Bandell, Judge Installs New Board at Pan American, S. FLA. Bus. J., May 2,
2005, available at http://www.bizjoumals.com/southflorida/stories/2005/05/02/story2.html.
11. See Bandell, supra note 109.
112. In re Pan Am. Hosp., Inc., No. 04-11819-BKC-AJC (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Apr. 6, 2005).
113. Id. at 2-3.
114. Id. at 4.
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stated the "the Evergreen Order was not permissive ... [by acting] with-
out court authority in using, or directing the use of the retainer, [Kluger
Peretz is] thereby acting at [its] own peril."' 1 5 Kluger Peretz now has
neither the security of a shortened fee application schedule, nor the ben-




Implicit in the Pan American Hospital court's opinion is a recogni-
tion that a pool of highly skilled bankruptcy lawyers willing to represent
debtors is necessary to give businesses a real shot at reorganizing.
1 1 6
Preserving this pool is a consistent concern to the bankruptcy bar
because the success rate of Chapter 11 is already low, and diminishing
the number of debtors' counselors would merely exacerbate the problem
of reorganizations converting into liquidations.'
17
The general presumptive validity of evergreen retainers is impor-
tant to bankruptcy practitioners. It stands to reason that most lawyers
will want a substantial retainer before becoming counsel for a Chapter
11 debtor. Evergreen retainers provide superior security to traditional or
security retainers in lengthy cases. For example, unexpected eventuali-
ties that may wreck the reorganization will at least be tempered by the
presence of the evergreen retainer. A more traditional retainer, or a
security retainer, will have already been exhausted by that point. Pro-
vided that a lawyer can prove that the fees are "substantial" and that they
comply with a market-driven conception of reasonableness, bankruptcy
practitioners should employ the use of evergreen retainers in large Chap-
ter 11 cases.
However, in very large Chapter 11 cases, the evergreen retainer
will provide only minimal security for the law firm. A million-dollar
evergreen retainer is not significant if the client is Enron, because
monthly fees will dwarf the retainer. In these situations, if multiple risk-
minimization devices are not an available option, it would be wiser for
the firm to rely on interim fee applications. However, in smaller cases
115. Id. at 11.
116. Cf Jay Westbrook, Fees and Inherent Conflicts of Interest, 1 AM. BANR. INST. L. REv.
287, 288 (1993). Professor Westbrook notes that the ability to obtain top counsel for a debtor has
become increasingly difficult. One reason is that many bankruptcy firms have been subsumed by
large firm practices that are inherently more subject to conflicts of interest in conducting debtor
work. Id. Professor Westbrook also praises debtors' lawyers as the "better half' of the
bankruptcy bar, in part because they must "orchestrate the overall case using high-level legal,
personal, and administrative skills.... [D]ebtor's counsel often needs multiple expertise." Id.
117. See WARREN & BRuSSEL, supra note 24, at 593.
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the evergreen retainer could cover several months of fees, providing sig-
nificant security, even if other devices are precluded.
B. Businesses
Businesses are placed in a difficult position by Pan American Hos-
pital. Evergreen retainers are more burdensome on the estate than most
retainers, because of the additional constraint upon operating capital.
Not only is the evergreen retainer itself held outstanding until the final
fee application, the interim payments must come from the operating cap-
ital of the debtor. Part of the problem is that courts have not viewed
evergreen retainers as more invidious than a traditional retainer or a
shortened fee application. Courts' ability to modify the terms of
employment upon motion by a creditor or the U.S. Trustee pursuant to
11 U.S.C. § 328 provides a great deal of comfort to the courts; if the
terms ever become unreasonable, the court can step in at the behest of
creditors.' 18 The use of § 328(a) as a panacea for evergreen retainers
that become unwieldy, however, is jurisprudentially questionable. In
construing § 328(a), some courts have found that a bankruptcy court is
not free to modify a pre-approved agreement under § 328(a) absent cir-
cumstances incapable of being anticipated at the time of approval.' 1 9 In
the case of Committee of Equity Security Holders of Federal-Mogul, Inc.
v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (In re Federal Mogul-
Global, Inc.), 2° Judge Alito of the Third Circuit wrote that "[t]he sec-
ond sentence of 11 U.S.C. § 328(a) thus forecloses the argument that a
Bankruptcy Court, if presented with an application containing an unrea-
sonable term or condition, may approve the application but correct the
unreasonable term when compensation is later sought."' 21 This places a
significant limitation on the ability of creditors to use § 328(a) as a
check against improvident evergreen retainers.
Accepting the procedural benefit that § 328(a) may offer in this
circumstance, a core issue still remains: granted that evergreen retainers
are, in some cases, permissible under the Bankruptcy Code, what cir-
cumstances make it financially provident for an insolvent firm to entice
attorneys with an evergreen retainer?
Insilco includes "the best interests of the estate" as a factor in
assessing the reasonableness of an evergreen retainer, but provides little
guidance for what constitutes the estate's "best interests." ' Maintain-
118. See In re Pan Am. Hosp. Corp., 312 B.R. 706, 713 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2004).
119. E.g., In re High Voltage Eng'g Corp., 311 B.R. 320, 331 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2004); In re
Merry-Go-Round Enters., Inc., 244 B.R. 327, 336-37 (Bankr. D. Md. 2000).
120. 348 F.3d 390 (3d Cir. 2003).
121. Id. at 397.
122. See In re Insilco Techs., Inc., 291 B.R. 628, 634 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003).
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ing good relations with pre-petition counsel, for instance, is in "the best
interests of the estate" under Insilco.123 It is easy to see that "the best
interests of the estate" can be broad and permissive, and indeed, the
cases addressing this issue concur. In Nostas Associates v. Costich (In
re Klein Sleep Products, Inc.), 124 Judge Calabresi of the Second Circuit
addressed the concept of "benefit to the estate" in a lease assumption,
dismissing the bankruptcy court's "unduly narrow view of the benefit
conferred on an estate when a trustee assumes an unexpired lease."
1 25
Notably, Judge Calabresi refused to require a "net benefit," because it
would mean that any post-bankruptcy contract entered into for the bene-
fit of a debtor's estate would lose priority "the moment the deal turned
sour." 126 By analogy, "benefit to the estate" in the case of evergreen
retainers would need to be similarly interpreted. Because the quality of
the attorney is directly related to the chances of success in a Chapter 11
case, almost any concession made by the business to an attorney, pro-
vided the terms themselves are reasonable in the court's opinion, could
be seen as in "the best interest of the estate." After all, the alternative is
that the corporation is left with inferior representation that is more likely
to result in a failed plan, which is most certainly not in the estate's best
interest. Therein lies the quandary faced by a debtor: law firms are per-
mitted to request from their clients a retainer that may impede ultimate
success in achieving the plan. In the alternative, firms with less leverage
with regard to bankruptcy prominence may provide more rational bene-
fit-to-cost ratio, but the increased risk of not achieving confirmation of
the plan is preclusive of this option for a distressed, risk-averse
corporation.
For businesses, the likely solution is contractual. To ensure that
they can free up at least part of an evergreen retainer in case of a cata-
strophic event that significantly constrains the cash flow on hand, a com-
pany should negotiate with a prospective law firm for a clause that
would release a percentage of funds upon a certain trigger. For example,
if Law Firms A, B, and C each possess evergreen retainers for $700,000,
a company could draft a contractual term that would automatically
release a small percentage of those funds when liquid assets possessed
by the company hit a designated floor. Such a clause would serve the
necessary function of sustaining a company if the problem is a relatively
minor one, while simultaneously providing security to the law firm if the
123. Id. at 635.
124. 78 F.3d 18 (2d Cir. 1996).
125. Id. at 24.
126. Id. at 26.
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problem is or becomes significant enough to derail the reorganization
process.
Another way for a business to manage the risk of evergreen fees is
to file a prepackaged or pre-negotiated Chapter 11 bankruptcy. This
option is less likely to be practicable in large, complex bankruptcy mat-
ters. 27 But for those companies that can take advantage of this legal
mechanism, the costs are on average one-third to one-fourth less than a
conventional case, last one-third of the time, and the companies emerge
with lower debt ratios. 128 However, a prepackaged or pre-negotiated
bankruptcy is not a fool-proof way to manage the risks and costs of a
Chapter 11 case, as the plan confirmation must still comport with appli-
cable non-bankruptcy law dealing with the adequacy of disclosure. 
129
C. Critiques
Because courts encourage debtors to engage high-quality lawyers to
guide the reorganization, and because Pan American Hospital requires
only a showing of "substantial" fees to warrant the application of an
evergreen retainer, attorneys concerned with recouping fees for their
work have an avenue for minimizing risk. However, such burdens on
operating capital create a risk of failing to achieve the ultimate goal of
Chapter 11: confirmation of a reorganization plan. Chapter 11 is already
a selfish process-management is seeking a plan that will preserve their
livelihood. More significantly, the bankruptcy process strips rationality
from the cost-benefit approach that normally guides retention of law-
yers. A market-driven approach to reasonableness, therefore, is at odds
with a system that some commentators criticize as eschewing the ration-
ality that is inherent in the marketplace.
Cynthia Baker, a former professor of law at Emory University, crit-
icizes the Chapter 11 process as one that ignores professional costs and
creates a "basic economic infirmity" in the current system.1 30 Professor
Baker notes that this results because the priority rules of bankruptcy
place the cost of bankruptcy upon the lower (or "junior") classes.1 31 The
debtor itself and the senior stakeholders in the Chapter 11 process have
no incentive to act rationally in hiring professionals, because costs
incurred that exceed benefits are not borne by those parties, but by jun-
127. See Fernando Diz & Martin J. Whitman, The Professional Costs of Chapter 11: A
Different View, 14 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 2 Art. 1 (2005) (demonstrating that "[f]irms involved in
conventional Chapter 11 cases are on average three times larger than those filing as prepackaged
or prenegotiated cases").
128. Id. at 4.
129. See In re Southland Corp., 124 B.R. 211, 223 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1991).
130. See Baker, supra note 29, at 42.
131. Id. at 46.
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ior stakeholders. 132
Similarly, Professor Baker is highly critical of court review of
attorney's fees. 13 3 "In large cases, reviewing fees and poring over hun-
dreds of pages in time records, consumes significant amounts of scarce
judicial resources ... [as well as] creates potential due process problems
.... 134 Indeed, in her view, "[t]he current system's reliance on court
review is a relic from the past, and should be discarded." 135 Professor
Baker proposes three modifications to correct the "perverse economic
incentives to overspend." 136 Her proposal includes eliminating court
review except where a party in interest objects, charging fees and
expenses by an official committee against distribution to the class that
the committee represents, and allocating fees incurred by the debtor-in-
possession's professionals "among all classes of unsecured claims and
equity interests [in the estate] in proportion to the value of property dis-
tributed to each class under the plan of reorganization. "137
D. Lamie
Finally, a recent decision by the United States Supreme Court may
lead to the increased usage of evergreen fee agreements. In Lamie v.
U.S. Trustee,138 the Court denied compensation in a Chapter-I1-turned-
Chapter-7 bankruptcy proceeding because "§ 330(a)(1) does not author-
ize payment of attorney's fees unless the attorney has been appointed
under § 327 of the [Bankruptcy] Code. ' 139 Section 327(a) allows for the
appointed trustee to employ one or more attorneys to represent or assist
the trustee in carrying out the trustee's duties, or under § 327(e) to
employ for special purposes an attorney that has represented the
debtor. "40
Post-Lamie, attorneys who provide services to a debtor post-con-
version have a right to be skittish, unless they are qualified under § 327.
Practicing attorneys, in response to Lamie, have devoted time to hedging
the significant risk that conversion presents if compensation cannot be
rendered under § 327(a). One solution for this problem is for a debtor's
attorney to request an evergreen retainer, and for whatever services ren-
dered after the conversion date to be covered by a retainer fee. The
132. See id. at 42, 46.
133. See id. at 59-67.
134. Id. at 67.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 38.
137. Id.
138. 540 U.S. 526 (2004).
139. Id. at 529.
140. See id. at 531.
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Supreme Court did not address the issue of whether post-conversion
legal fees could be paid out of a pre-petition retainer, and this seems to
be precisely an instance where a law firm would want an evergreen
retainer.
V. CONCLUSION
Pan American Hospital is a decision that can be difficult to parse.
The court was between a rock and a hard place. On the one hand, they
had a law firm that sought a method of compensation that inflicted con-
straints upon the operating capital of the debtor and was possibly haz-
ardous to borderline Chapter 11 bankruptcies. This necessarily creates a
need for some scrutiny. But too much scrutiny, such as per se invalidity,
would cause the best bankruptcy attorneys to shy away from Chapter 11
work; without these top attorneys operating on behalf of debtors, very
few Chapter 11 restructurings would reach completion. Given these two
unacceptable results, the court reached out for a middle ground: pro-
vided that the debtor can show some substantiality in fees (and an undue
hardship if the professionals seeking compensation involve more than
one risk-minimizing device) and compliance with factors enunciated in
Insilco, evergreen retainers are valid. 1 ' To hedge against the possibility
of such a retainer unconscionably constraining the debtor's operating
capital, the court allowed for a continuing reassessment of the reasona-
bleness of the size and terms of the retainer, provided the U.S. Trustee
and vigilant creditors object.
142
Rather than discarding Insilco, Pan American Hospital attempts to
mend its flaws by filtering the terms of the retainer through a watered-
down Knudsen. Evergreen retainers, as they exist today, require sub-
stantial fees and allow for many grounds for objection by creditors or the
U.S. Trustee. While this compromise between the restrictive Knudsen
and market-driven Insilco is appropriate in terms of enticing premier
bankruptcy attorneys to take on Chapter I I cases, it still fails to
acknowledge the possible irrationality that may occur when a debtor
hires an attorney. 43 To fully extinguish the risks of irrationality that
would taint the Chapter 11 process, courts should also establish proce-
dures to ensure that the evergreen retainer is narrowly tailored to achieve
the least risk-minimization necessary to entice counsel, while simultane-
ously providing the most liquidity possible to the reorganizing debtor.
While Pan American Hospital does this implicitly, such a requirement
141. See In re Pan Am. Hosp. Corp., 312 B.R. 706, 710-12 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2004).
142. See id. at 713.
143. See supra note 129, and accompanying text.
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must be set out explicitly to provide a defined equilibrium to the players
in the game of Chapter 11.
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